Programme

A PDF of the programme can be found here

The conference starts with a reception at 7pm on Sunday 18th September at Matou Pan Asian Restaurant. The talks take place on Monday 19th, Tuesday 20th, and half of Wednesday 21st September 2016 at the Hilton Liverpool City Center. The conference dinner is at 7pm on Tuesday 20th September at the The Racquet Club (map here).

Quick links to the program for: Monday; Tuesday; Wednesday.

7pm Sunday 18th September - Reception at Matou Pan Asian Restaurant

Monday 19th September

09:30-10:30	Invited talk - A Normalized Value for Information Purchases	Olivier Gossner
10:30-11:00	Coffee
11:00-11:20	Logarithmic Query Complexity for Approximate Nash Computation in Large Games	Paul Goldberg, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossio and Zhiwei Steven Wu
11:20-11:40	Lipschitz Continuity and Approximate Equilibria	Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley and Paul Spirakis
11:40-12:00	The parallel complexity of coloring games	Guillaume Ducoffe
12:00-12:20	Complexity and Optimality of the Best Response Algorithm in Random Potential Games	Stéphane Durand and Bruno Gaujal
12:20-14:00	Lunch
14:00-14:30	The Big Match in Small Space (BEST PAPER)	Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen and Michal Koucky
14:30-14:50	Deciding Maxmin Reachability in Half-Blind Stochastic Games	Edon Kelmendi and Hugo Gimbert
14:50-15:10	History-Independent Distributed Multi-Agent Learning	Amos Fiat, Yishay Mansour and Mariano Schain
15:10-15:30	On the Robustness of the Approximate Price of Anarchy in Generalized Congestion Games	Vittorio Bilò
15:30-16:00	Coffee
16:00-16:20	Efficiency of equilibria in uniform matroid congestion games	Jasper de Jong, Max Klimm and Marc Uetz
16:20-16:40	On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games	Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Roberto Cominetti and Marco Scarsini
16:40-17:00	The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games	Pieter Kleer and Guido Schaefer
17:00-17:20	On Selfish Creation of Robust Networks	Ankit Chauhan, Pascal Lenzner, Anna Melnichenko and Martin Münn
18:00-19:30	Optional walking tour

Tuesday 20th September

09:30-10:30	Invited talk - Linear Fisher Markets with Satiation	Kurt Mehlhorn
10:30-11:00	Coffee
11:00-11:20	Dynamic Resource Allocation Games	Guy Avni, Thomas A. Henzinger and Orna Kupferman
11:20-11:40	Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games With Super-Increasing Weights	Yoram Bachrach, Filmus Yuval, Joel Oren and Yair Zick
11:40-12:00	Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting	Reshef Meir
12:00-12:20	Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences	Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei and Baharak Rastegari
12:20-14:00	Lunch
14:00-14:20	The Stable Roommates problem with short lists	Ágnes Cseh, Robert W. Irving and David F. Manlove
14:20-14:40	The price of stability of simple symmetric fractional hedonic games	Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Konstantinos Papaioannou
14:40-15:00	Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders	Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler
15:00-15:20	Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets	Evangelos Markakis and Orestis Telelis
15:20-15:50	Coffee
15:50-16:10	SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism	Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann
16:10-16:30	Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors	Matthias Gerstgrasser, Paul Goldberg and Elias Koutsoupias
16:30-16:50	Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains	Matúš Mihalák, Paolo Penna and Peter Widmayer
16:50-17:10	The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money	Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias and Maria Kyropoulou
19:00-	Conference Dinner	The Racquet Club

Conference dinner

The conference dinner will take place at 7pm on Tuesday at the The Racquet Club.

Wednesday 21st September

09:30-10:30	Invited talk - Mechanism Design for Learning Agents	Costis Daskalakis
10:30-11:00	Coffee
11:00-11:20	An almost ideal coordination mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling	Ioannis Caragiannis and Angelo Fanelli
11:20-11:40	Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian Games	George Christodoulou, Stefano Leonardi and Alkmini Sgouritsa
11:40-12:00	Essential μ-compatible subgames for obtaining a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in an assignment game	Keisuke Bando and Yakuma Furusawa
12:00-12:20	Repeated multimarket contact with observation errors	Atsushi Iwasaki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Shun Yamamoto and Makoto Yokoo
12:20-14:00	Lunch
14:00	The End