SAGT 2016 Accepted Papers

The conference proceedings are available here.

Jasper de Jong, Max Klimm and Marc Uetz. Efficiency of equilibria in uniform matroid congestion games
Reshef Meir. Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting
Keisuke Bando and Yakuma Furusawa. Essential μ-compatible subgames for obtaining a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in an assignment game
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Roberto Cominetti and Marco Scarsini. On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann. A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism
Guillaume Ducoffe. The parallel complexity of coloring games
George Christodoulou, Stefano Leonardi and Alkmini Sgouritsa. Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian Games
Guy Avni, Thomas A. Henzinger and Orna Kupferman. Dynamic Resource Allocation Games
Atsushi Iwasaki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Shun Yamamoto and Makoto Yokoo. Repeated multimarket contact with observation errors
Stéphane Durand and Bruno Gaujal. Complexity and Optimality of the Best Response Algorithm in Random Potential Games
Yoram Bachrach, Filmus Yuval, Joel Oren and Yair Zick. Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games With Super-Increasing Weights
Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley and Paul Spirakis. Lipschitz Continuity and Approximate Equilibria
Edon Kelmendi and Hugo Gimbert. Deciding Maxmin Reachability in Half-Blind Stochastic Games
Amos Fiat, Yishay Mansour and Mariano Schain. History-Independent Distributed Multi-Agent Learning
Matthias Gerstgrasser, Paul Goldberg and Elias Koutsoupias. Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors
Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler. Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders
Ágnes Cseh, Robert W. Irving and David F. Manlove. The Stable Roommates problem with short lists
Pieter Kleer and Guido Schaefer. The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing games
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen and Michal Koucky. The Big Match in Small Space (BEST PAPER)
Matúš Mihalák, Paolo Penna and Peter Widmayer. Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains
Paul W. Goldberg, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossio and Zhiwei Steven Wu. Logarithmic Query Complexity for Approximate Nash Computation in Large Games
Vittorio Bilò. On the Robustness of the Approximate Price of Anarchy in Generalized Congestion Games
Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei and Baharak Rastegari. Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias and Maria Kyropoulou. The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money
Ankit Chauhan, Pascal Lenzner, Anna Melnichenko and Martin Münn. On Selfish Creation of Robust Networks
Evangelos Markakis and Orestis Telelis. Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets
Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Konstantinos Papaioannou. The price of stability of simple symmetric fractional hedonic games
Ioannis Caragiannis and Angelo Fanelli. An almost ideal coordination mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling